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INTRODUCTION 
On 8 August 1988, in a short meeting of the Security Council, the UN 
Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar announced a cease-fire for 20 August 1988 
(Disengagement or "D-Day"). It was aimed at ending an eight-year long war 
between Iraq and Iran, a brutal conflict that cost more than one million lives and 
over 1000 billion US dollars. The declaration of D-Day was a historic moment 
not only for Iran and Iraq, but also for the rest of the world. 
At first view, the Iran-Iraq cease-fire came into being because of the 
exhaustion of peoples and economies. But a thorough study has to bear in mind 
the crucial role played by the United Nations. Many studies, however, neglect 
this role.1 Little has been written about the "good offices" of the UN Secretary-
General, which provided the first realistic basis for an end to the war, or about 
the role of the Security Council and its Resolution 598, which laid the ground-
work for the cease-fire, and also dealt with the supervision of the cease-fire and 
the successive withdrawals of troops. 
Resolution 598 was not only a masterpiece of diplomacy; it also gave 
successful proof of a new "old" technique: informal, confidential consultations 
among the five permanent members of the Council. After 40 years of existence 
on paper, this group became a highly influential lobby. As Sir Brian Urquhart 
put it: "For the first time, the Security Council was able to function as envisaged 
by its founders."2 Therefore, Resolution 598 was a new beginning in a double 
sense: for the parties of the conflict and for the members of the Security Council. 
This article presents a critical analysis of the negotiations that led to the 
cease-fire of 20 August 1988. It is based on information gleaned from several 
interviews with United Nations officials and diplomats of UN missions in New 
York. Evidence from UN documents rounds out the description of the role of the 
UN in settling the Iran-Iraq War 1980-88. It begins with a brief explanation of 
the UN instruments available for the peaceful settlement of disputes. 
UN INSTRUMENTS FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT 
OF DISPUTES 
The founding document of the United Nations, the UN Charter of 26 
June 1945, names the organization's first objective as being "the maintaining of 
international peace and security and the taking of effective collective measures 
to mat end." Details can be found in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. These 
chapters differ fundamentally. 
Chapter VI treats the peaceful settlement of disputes, while Chapter VII 
provides for collective measures against threats to, or breaches of, peace. The 
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measures mat could be undertaken extend as far as the implementation of 
economic boycotts or even militaiy sanctions.3 
The system of collective security envisaged in Chapter Vu remained, 
with few exceptions, a "dead letter" of the UN Charter. The collective use of 
military force by the Security Council never materialized. Neither the Korean 
Operation in the 1950s nor the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 were undertaken 
under Article 42 of the Charter. 
Instead of using the Security Council for collective "protection," the 
superpowers built up their own collective defences. Only in the case of conflicts 
that the alliances did not want to, or could not, settle, did they grant the UN 
limited powers. From this "loophole" the UN developed its peacekeeping 
instruments, which became habitual in use due to numerous applications.4 
The goal of UN peacekeeping is the neutralization or defusing of 
international conflict situations through the use of multinational military per-
sonnel under UN command.5 From the beginning to the end, the operation needs 
the consent of all parties involved. This consensus has to be reached on four 
levels: consent of the Security Council—first of all its five permanent members, 
the parties of the conflict, the troop-contributing countries, and the financing 
states. The need for a far reaching consensus underlies any UN peacekeeping 
operation. 
UN peacekeeping is basically practised in two forms: either by UN 
peacekeeping forces or by so-called UN military observer groups. As a rule, the 
mandate for UN peacekeeping is issued by the Security Council.6 Under its 
authority, the UN Secretariat is responsible for the day-to-day management of 
the operation. The head of the UN Secretariat is the UN Secretary-General who, 
according to Article 99 of the Charter, can also mediate between the disputing 
parties. His good offices may foster the work of the Security Council and may 
also lay the groundwork for future peacekeeping operations. Finally, the 
General Assembly is responsible for the financing of UN peacekeeping opera-
tions. 
The decision-making body for the deployment of UN soldiers, the 
Security Council, consists of 15 members: five permanent members with special 
rights (such as the right to veto) and ten non-permanent members who are chosen 
for a period of two years from among the UN member states according to a 
regional key.7 In purely formal terms, Security Council decisions are reached 
by members' votes. In practice, however, particularly in recent years, an 
informal decision-making process has come to be used, in order to avoid open 
voting, and to allow considerable scope for diplomacy. By this means, the 
worsening of conflicts caused by the necessity of publicly taking sides should 
be avoided. Nowadays, confidential consultations form the backbone of the 
Council's work. 
Decisions reached through consultations are announced, if at all, by a 
statement issued by the Council president Resolution 598 is a prime example 
of this kind of decision-making in the Security Council. In this case the 
mechanics of consultation worked more effectively than ever before. 
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PAST HISTORY OF RESOLUTION 598 
The Iran-Iraq conflict has its roots in the rivalry between Persia and 
Arabia, which goes back to the seventh century. The question of their common 
border was in the forefront of the dispute. Since 1520, the two sides had come 
to no fewer than 18 agreements concerning this matter alone.8 Iraq brought the 
conflict before the Security Council, which requested the Secretary-General to 
appoint a special representative to look into this tense situation.9 
The Mexican ambassador to West Germany, Luis Weckmann-Munos 
travelled as a special representative to the area of conflict. He concluded that a 
great deal of the tension had been caused by inaccurately-defined borders and 
misunderstandings between the two governments. Both governments had, 
however, indicated their readiness to look for a comprehensive settlement of 
their grievances under UN supervision. This would, though, according to 
Weckmann, demand a larger UN commitment, including the stationing of 
military observers along the border.10 The Security Council did not take up these 
suggestions, and the UN engagement ended without result. Through Algerian 
and Egyptian mediation, Iraq granted Iran shared sovereignty in the economi-
cally important Shatt al-Arab in the Algiers Agreement of March 1975. 
After the formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran war broke out 
between the two neighbors. After several border incidents, on 22 September 
1980 Iraqi bombers penetrated deep into Iranian airspace, accompanied by a 
powerful invasion by Iraqi ground troops on 23 September. These operations are 
generally taken as the start of the war, although Iraq named 9 September as the 
beginning of the military conflict11 In a letter to the UN Secretary-General of 
25 September Iraq's President Saddam Hussein explained that "Iraq's objective 
(was) only to gain Iran's irrevocable recognition of Iraq's rights over its lands 
and sovereignty over its territorial waters."12 
On 22 September UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim had called 
upon the conflicting sides to solve their dispute peacefully, and offered them his 
good offices. On 23 September Waldheim summoned the Security Council, 
which supported his appeal to the parties of the conflict.13 At the request of 
Mexico and Norway, on 28 September the Council adopted Resolution 479 
(1980) which called for an end to the fighting, although not for a withdrawal 
behind the internationally recognized borders. By this action, the Security 
Council was taking sides with Iraq.14 
Behind this action may well have been the international outrage directed 
against Iran for the taking hostage of American diplomats in Teheran. Iranian 
Prime Minister Radschai's provocative speech before the Council on 17 
October did little to arouse sympathy for Iran, as did the aggressive appearances 
of the Iranian UN Deputy Ardakani.15 
The Council showed itself to be just as biased when it adopted Resolu-
tion 514 (1982) on 12 July 1982. This resolution was passed after Iran had gained 
the upper-hand militarily and had advanced into Iraqi territory. Only then did the 
Council demand that both sides retreat behind internationally recognized 
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borders. Furthermore, the Resolution called for an immediate cease-fire and 
considered sending UN observers.16 
Iran rejected both Council resolutions (479 and S14) as unjust In a letter 
to the President of the Security Council dated 14 July 1982, Iran rejected any 
further Security Council decisions in the Gulf conflict.17 In its view, the Council 
had not carried out its obligations towards ending the conflict and had paid no 
attention whatsoever to Iraqi aggression.18 
This rejection of the Council only applied, however, to its handling of the 
Gulf conflict. In other areas, such as the Middle East question, Iran played a full 
role—its speakers even used such opportunities to berate publicly the Council 
and its members. 
Iran's rejection of the Security Council in Gulf matters increased the 
value of the good offices of the Secretary-General. He served as a channel of 
communication through his own cautious statements and by acting as a mailbox 
for official letters sent by Iran and Iraq. As such, his good offices provided the 
only channel for peaceful communication between the two sides. Good offices 
communication developed in four particular areas: free shipping access in the 
Gulf, treatment of prisoners of war, deployment of chemical weapons, and 
bombardment of civilian targets. 
At the beginning the Secretary-General had tried to institutionalize his 
good offices by the appointment of a prominent special emissary. On 11 
November 1980 Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme was appointed Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for the Conflict in the Persian Gulf. He 
kept this office until his assassination in 1986. 
Palme travelled to Iran and Iraq five times. Mediating the question of 
free shipping in the Persian Gulf became an important task. Twice he tried to 
free foreign ships caught in the Shaft Al-Arab, proposing to evacuate these ships 
under a UN flag. However, this, as with other initiatives, proved to be a dead-
end, because of Iraq's sovereignty claims. 
In the first two years of the Gulf War the Special Representative kept a 
close eye on the situation on the ground, but his diplomatic missions failed for 
lack of consensus among the parties of the conflict. On the other hand, both sides 
agreed that the problem areas defined above required regulation. This was a task 
the Secretary-General could fulfil. His approach was not to steer towards an end 
to the military clashes, but to try instead to avoid an escalation of the armed 
conflict With this tactic the Secretary-General was successful in gaining the 
trust of both sides. He could use this trust for the later mediation of a cease-fire. 
Over and above that, he could achieve temporary successes for the moment For 
instance, his negotiations led to a moratorium on attacking civilian targets on 12 
June 1984: this put a stop to the war in the cities for several months and enabled 
two United Nations Inspection Teams to be stationed in Teheran and Baghdad. 
In autumn 1986 the Security Council once more became influential 
following a very successful Iranian military offensive. The Iranians conquered 
the Fao peninsula and Iraq began to use massive chemical weapons in its 
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defence. In this dramatic situation the Security Council altered its pro-Iraqi 
stance. Resolution 582 (1986) mentioned for the first time in cautious terms the 
question of war-guilt, addressing Iran's great concern over Iraq's invasion 
having triggered the war.19 
Iran did indeed recognize positive elements in Resolution 582, but it still 
insisted upon an explicit condemnation of Iraq as the aggressor. As Iraq was not 
condemned by the Security Council, the Secretary-General had to repeat in 
November 1986 that the differences of opinion between the two sides had not 
lessened.20 
The conflict was also becoming increasingly dangerous, as the US 
brought in more and more military forces to protect civilian ships.21 It had been 
clear since early autumn that a new diplomatic initiative was needed to prevent 
a further escalation of the war. In autumn 1986 the five permanent members of 
the Security Council agreed upon a joint confidential action as a new attempt at 
ending the Gulf War. 
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURE OF RESOLUTION 598 
Resolution 598 was unanimously adopted in July 1987 by the Security 
Council in the presence of six foreign ministers. It provided the formal 
framework for the cease-fire and its supervision by the United Nations Iran Iraq 
Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG). The Resolution is a masterpiece of 
diplomacy, and for this reason has many "fathers." 
Generally, the Secretary-General's annual press conference on 13 
January 1987 is judged to have been the "starting signal." On this occasion the 
Secretary-General called officially upon the five permanent Council members 
to make a more resolute effort to resolve the conflict.22 According to a copy of 
the press conference, the Secretary-General explained that 
what has to be shown is a political determination by members of 
the Security Council, and mainly the five permanent members, 
to find a solution to the problem.23 
Because of this press statement the Secretary-General was pushed forward as the 
"flagship" of an initiative that had developed in early autumn 1986 during 
discussions between senior British and American UN diplomats. When the 
Secretary-General put forward "elements" of the future Resolution at a plenary 
consultation of the Security Council on 23 January 1987, these elements had in 
fact long been agreed upon among the five permanent Council members. 
The first "non-paper"24 was written in September 1986 in the law 
department of the US Mission to the United Nations. It appeared as a package 
of three resolutions. The first resolution would order a cease-fire, threatening 
sanctions if this was not carried out The second would, if a cease-fire had not 
come into effect within two weeks, announce the sanctions by the Council. 
Finally, the third resolution would deal with the details of sanctions, ordering 
them within a further two weeks.23 
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This paper formed the basis for the initiative proposed by the British UN 
ambassador John Thomson, who presented "his" ideas at the informal monthly 
luncheon of the Security Council members in October 1986 in the presence of 
the UN Secretary-General.26 Prior to the luncheon, an arrangement had been 
made with the Soviets who had agreed to the initiative. Upon this proposal the 
five permanent Council members developed a draft resolution.27 
During an intensive consultation process, it became increasingly clear 
that the US wanted to implement an arms embargo against Iran. The US tried to 
use the opportunity to improve its strained relationship with the important Arab 
oil states—strained because of US connections with Israel—through dealings 
designed to show obvious solidarity with Iraq. The US Deputy Secretary of 
State, Richard Murphy, had promised the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, 
during his visit to Baghdad on 11 May 1987 that the USA would push forward 
a resolution in the Security Council which would lead to an arms embargo 
against Iran.2* 
When plans were officially drawn up in May 1987, a strange coalition 
of the former Axis states of the Second World War (West Germany, Italy, 
Japan), as well as the non-aligned states made substantial suggestions for 
amendments and modifications of the wording.29 On Ghana's initiative, the 
non-aligned states suggested the deployment of a UN military observer group 
to supervise the peace process. This proposal was agreed upon quickly by all 
Council members. 
The outcome of the consultation process, Resolution 598, was adopted 
on 20 July 1987. In the Resolution, the Council demanded as a prerequisite for 
a negotiated solution a cease-fire in the Gulf war and the withdrawal of troops 
to the internationally recognized borders without delay. It emphasized explicitly 
the existence of a breach of peace, according to the language used in Chapter VJJ 
of the UN Charter. In the background was the clear threat of an arms embargo, 
which was amplified by the mentioning of possible further steps. 
The operational second paragraph of the Resolution requested the 
Secretary-General to dispatch a team of observers to "verify, confirm and 
supervise" the cease-fire and withdrawal. A third part of the Resolution dealt 
with the questions of prisoners of war, the responsibility for the conflict 
(investigation of war-guilt) and reparation. 
The draft Resolution, presented as a "presidential paper,"30 was put to a 
vote in the presence of six foreign ministers.31 Their public statements following 
the adoption of the Resolution indicated different positions and differing 
interpretations of Resolution 598.32 China asked the other permanent Council 
members to take into account the opinions of the non-permanent members as 
well as those of other interested parties. China furthermore declared that the UN 
Secretary-General must have sufficient time for negotiations, making clear its 
uneasiness regarding sanctions against Iran. China also requested "that other 
countries concerned, the major Powers in particular, will exercise restraint," a 
comment directed at the Western naval presence in the Gulf, and the sale of 
weapons by, above all, the Soviet Union and France.33 
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Great Britain declared itself proud to have played a prominent role in the 
consultations from the outset The British Foreign Minister, Sir Geoffrey Howe, 
clearly as a sign of good-will towards Iran, explicitly underlined the war-guilt 
question saying, "Yes we should ask how the conflict started and how we should 
apportion blame." On the other hand, he implicitly warned Iran of a possible 
arms embargo, a warning mat was repeated, also implicitly, by US Secretary of 
State, George Shultz. 
West Germany's Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher stressed the 
involvement of the non-permanent Council members in the matters of war-guilt, 
reparations and regional security mentioned by the Resolution. The original 
wording of the Resolution called for an "immediate cease-fire" and "withdrawal 
without delay," but Genscher interpreted the first paragraph as being a two-stage 
requirement: first cease-fire, then withdrawal. 
The Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti, while addressing the five 
permanent members of the Council, said that, although the methods which had 
led to Resolution 598 were justified in this special case, it should not become the 
rule to proceed in the same manner.34 Italy was thereby raising the fears of the 
smaller Council members that a new form of secret diplomacy could develop in 
the Security Council. Toward the end of his statement, Andreotti revealed that 
he was reckoning on a further resolution, and agreed to this in advance: "My 
delegation will support the existing draft resolution as well as the follow-up 
action." 
The Soviet UN Ambassador declared that the consensus of the five 
permanent Council members had set an outstanding precedent for dealing with 
other crisis areas. 
Ghana criticized — indirectly, but clearly — the arms dealings of the 
superpowers, the presence of the Western fleets in the Gulf, and Anglo-
American plans for an arms embargo against Iran based on the regulations in 
Charter VII of the UN Charten 
Those countries that are best placed to influence the two parties 
in the direction of peace have openly taken sides and provided 
resources for the continuation of the war, in spite of the Security 
Council resolutions . . . . It would be unfortunate if the present 
exercise of the Council's powers were to be interpreted as giving 
licence to the dispatch of punitive expeditions by one or another 
of the Members of the United Nations to pacify the area. There 
should be no room for unilaterally imposed solutions nor any 
mandate for concerted action by a few States. 
Li spite of these differing views, the dispute never appeared in the public 
record during the consultations of the Security Council. The members managed 
to reach consensus on an informal, confidential basis. 
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IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 598 
Iraq welcomed Resolution 598 and declared itself ready to carry out all 
of its obligations.33 In contrast, Iran criticized the Resolution as suffering from 
"fundamental defects and incongruities" without, however, explicitly rejecting 
it (as the US had foreseen).36 For Iran, still superior militarily on the ground, the 
Resolution was unacceptable because it demanded a cease-fire and the with-
drawal as pre-conditions for negotiations. 
m order to accommodate Iran, the Secretary-General in September 1987 
came up with his own outline for an implementation plan. Before he presented 
the outline, he had won the support of the five permanent Council members at 
special consultations on a very high level.37 This outline implementation plan 
separated the withdrawal from the cease-fire, and unlike the Resolution itself, 
dealt with both of these questions in separate sections of the paper. It also 
declared that it would be possible from the day of cease-fire onwards to set up 
an impartial body to inquire into responsibility for the conflict.38 To some extent, 
this plan contradicted Resolution 598, creating a paradoxical situation. Whilst 
Iran accepted the Secretary-General's outline as a basis for further negotiations, 
Iraq insisted on the original wording of Resolution 598. 
The Secretary-General's suggestions were, indeed, more realistic as 
they were based on the actual power of the two conflicting sides at the time. The 
disadvantage of his realistic approach was that to some extent it was dictated by 
the Iranian interest Altogether, the advantage of his initiative was greater than 
the disadvantage because it provided the only chance for a minimum of 
consensus. It is natural that the looser should make greater concessions in a 
compromise than the victor. 
After long hesitation, the Security Council officially approved the 
Secretary-General's outline plan. Diplomats in New York suddenly had to deal 
with a second (co-operative) option contrary to the US-sponsored option of 
sanctions against Iran. The US followed the development of the co-operative 
alternative—sponsored above all by West Germany—with great mistrust, the 
American diplomats suspecting diversionary maneuvers to be behind the 
Iranian negotiating tactics. 
Iranian diplomats had contributed to this mistrust by having repeatedly 
declared since March 1988 within small diplomatic circles that Iran was on the 
point of accepting Resolution 598. Their declarations were never made public. 
Obviously, they were part of the Iranian tactic to prevent the threatened arms 
embargo. In the end, dus tactic succeeded. Even in July 1988, the usually well-
informed UN correspondent of the New York Times was unable to understand 
the Iranian diplomatic springtime maneuver.39 
Certainly, the risk to Iran should not be underestimated either. The 
American push for an arms embargo was never contradicted in principal by the 
other permanent Council members. Their views differed merely as to the timing 
of a follow-up resolution. China, above all, in this circle was in favor of using 
all co-operative means before taking the path of confrontation in the form of an 
arms embargo. 
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The US, on the other hand, attempted at the highest level to win over the 
Soviet Union to a joint action against Iran. Several times, the US Secretary of 
State spoke with his counterpart in Moscow. In February 1988 US Secretary of 
State Shultz presented a draft resolution for an arms embargo that would come 
into effect after another thirty-day negotiation deadline.40 The Soviet Union, so 
far, did not agree, even during the intensive lobbying period in February 1988, 
when the US held the presidency in the Security Council. American sources 
commented, however, that Soviet patience with Iran ought to have been rather 
exhausted by late spring 1988.41 
Finally, the co-operative measure won out, thanks to the patient media-
tion of the other powers, West Germany in particular.42 Germany and Iran have 
a long tradition of close relations, especially in economic fields. This traditional 
friendship outlasted such tense times as the Iranian hostage crisis. West 
Germany could advocate Iranian positions in the Security Council relatively 
easily because the nonpermanent members of the West formed a homogenous 
lobby group. 
Iran's readiness to give way diplomatically grew with her increasing 
problems at the wartime front in early 1988, although the deciding diplomatic 
step occurred only after an American warship shot down an Iranian civilian 
aircraft.43 
This occurrence, regretted by the US as a tragic mistake, gave Iran the 
opportunity of returning to the negotiating table without loss of face, but with 
the expectation of a friendly reception and in the hope of a condemnation of the 
US in the Council. At the request of Iran the Security Council convened on 14 
July 1988, and, after several days of consultation, on 20 July the Council 
expressed its "deep distress" over the incident, without, however, condemning 
the US.44 
While the Council was still discussing the downing of the airliner, Iran 
declared its acceptance of Resolution 598.45 On 18 July the speaker of the 
Iranian Parliament, Hashemi Rafsanjani, communicated this acceptance to the 
Iranian people. This explicit acceptance of Resolution 598 must surely have 
been preceded by a brief, but hard struggle between the radical and moderate 
powers in Iran. On 20 July 1988, the Ayatollah Khomeini declared that the 
acceptance of the Résolution was a "very bitter and tragic issue for everyone, 
particularly for me.'*46 It was no sudden coincidence that the Iranian UN 
Ambassador insisted upon bringing the formal news of acceptance to the UN 
Secretary-General in person at midnight.47 
In its haste Iran might have sacrificed the possibility of a more strongly-
worded Council resolution over the airliner incident In the opinions of several 
diplomats, after two or three more days of negotiations a resolution more 
friendly towards Iran would have been passed. 
Although Iraq accepted the Resolution, with its favorable military 
position, delayed implementing the cease-fire in order to gain more territory and 
prisoners. After unsuccessful talks with the Iranian and Iraqi foreign ministers 
in New York, the Secretary-General threatened to call the cease-fire on his own 
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initiative after an agreement with the Security Council: "D-Day does not depend 
on the parties."48 
Supported by the Security Council, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait 
pressed the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, to accept the cease-fire. On 6 
August 1988, the Iraqi UN Ambassador Kittani declared to the Secretary-
General, in the presence of the Saudi-Arabian foreign minister, that his country 
accepted the cease-fire.49 
After consultations in the Security Council on 8 August, the Secretary-
General called a cease-fire for 20 August 1988, and urged restraint on the 
conflicting parties.30 He also announced the start of direct talks between Iran and 
Iraq on 25 August in Geneva. The Security Council supported bis appeal and on 
9 August set up UNTIMOG for an initial period of six months.51 
UNIIMOG (UNITED NATIONS IRAN IRAQ 
MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP) 
UNIJMOG was a conditio sine qua non of the cease-fire in the Gulf 
conflict It became a clear success for the United Nations thanks to the Security 
Council, which decided to take action rather than just remain passive. The 
mandate of UNIIMOG is contained in Resolution 598. On 7 August 1988, one 
day before the announcement of the cease-fire, the Secretary-General published 
details of the operation.52 The tasks of UNIIMOG were: 
(a) to establish with the conflicting parties agreed upon cease-fire 
lines, based on the forward defended localities occupied by the two 
sides on D-Day, and to adjust these, as may be agreed upon, when 
the positions of the two sides were judged to be dangerously close 
to each other, 
(b) to monitor compliance with the cease-fire; 
(c) to investigate any alleged violations of the cease-fire and restore the 
situation if a violation had taken place; 
(d) to prevent, through negotiation, any other change in the status quo, 
pending withdrawal of all forces to the internationally recognized 
boundaries; 
(e) to supervise, verify and confirm the withdrawal of all forces to the 
internationally recognized boundaries; 
(f) thereafter, to monitor the cease-fire on the internationally recog-
nized boundaries, investigate alleged violations and prevent, through 
negotiations, any other change in the status quo pending negotia-
tion of a comprehensive settlement; 
(g) to obtain the agreement of the parties to other arrangements which, 
pending negotiation of a comprehensive settlement, could help to 
reduce tension and build confidence between them, such as the 
establishment of areas of separation for forces on either side of the 
international border, limitations on the number and calibre of 
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weapons to be deployed in areas close to the international border, 
and patrolling by UN naval personnel of certain sensitive areas on 
or near the Shatt-al-Arab. 
The Secretary-General set UNIIMOG's strength at 350 UN military 
observers. Twenty-six states provided soldiers. On the day of the cease-fire, 307 
of the 350 military observers were in the area of operations, carrying out 51 
patrols, designed above all to mark out the positions of the advance lines. 
Due to the difficult terrain in the northern area, UNIIMOG could not set 
an exact positioning of the front there until November. The later disagreement 
of the parties to the conflict over the front line on D-Day, had, however, less to 
do with these northern areas man with the strategically more important areas in 
the southern plain. 
The UN units in Iran were in direct radio contact with those in Iraq, and 
the observers met regularly in no-mans-land. Although both sides had early 
agreed upon an opening of three border crossings for UN personnel and vehicles, 
they did not allow the necessary freedom of movement to the UN military 
observers. 
UNIIMOG operated along a relatively stabilized front whose positions 
were continually being reinforced by both sides. UN soldiers even reported the 
strengthening of defence lines with the placing of mines, and in one instance by 
the flooding of no-mans-land, which caused a brief loss of control of the 
situation.53 In total during the first six months UNIIMOG received 1,960 
complaints over alleged violations of the cease-fire; of these the observers 
confirmed around 25 per cent54 In almost every case UNQMOG was able to 
reduce aggression on the spot. 
As is usual with peacekeeping operations, UNIIMOG was mandated for 
a preliminary period of six months.55 After that time, the mandate was regularly 
extended by the Security Council for about the same length of time. It expired 
on 28 February 1991 and was not extended any longer on the recommendation 
of the Secretary-General.56 Instead, the military observer group was replaced by 
small civilian UN offices. 
In conclusion, UNIIMOG fulfilled the main provision of its mandate: 
to supervise and stabilize a cease-fire in a volatile area of disengagement. 
During the first months after the eight-year long war many aggressive and 
potentially dangerous situations arose, which could have escalated into war 
again. However, thanks to UNIIMOG, these tensions were reduced immedi-
ately on die spot In the last mandate periods of the operation the situation on 
the ground remained calm. 
The other tasks of the observer group set out by Resolution 598 could not 
be implemented, including establishing an area of separation and limiting 
armaments, pending negotiation of a comprehensive settlement. Since 
UNIIMOG's means of fostering this settlement were very limited—it had no 
political mandate to mediate on its own—the Secretary General's decision to 
withdraw UNIIMOG, in spite of open questions, was a wise choice. It saved 
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UNIIMOG from gliding automatically towards an open-ended operation fol-
lowing die sad examples of some other UN peacekeeping operations.57 But it 
also showed die limits of UN peacekeeping operations. As soon as the consensus 
had been broken, their mandates ended — whether the situation on the spot 
demanded an extension of the mandate or not. 
Was Iraq more co-operative toward Iran at the end of UNHMOG's term 
of duty than at the beginning? Iraq did appearto be more accommodatingtoward 
Iran when the UNIIMOG observers left their positions. One rationale for tiüs 
could have been Iraq's need to avoid a second-front during its attack on Kuwait. 
Indeed, Iran remained neutral during the Kuwait War, but the reason for Iran's 
neutrality is not completely clear yet. It may be assumed mat it had very little to 
do with the settlement of the first Gulf War. 
CONCLUSION 
The role of the UN in the settlement of the Iran-Iraq War highlights 
several major features of this conflict resolution process. The consensus-
building for and the making of Resolution 598 is a brilliant example of positive 
interaction among states. Success and failure in the negotiating process illus-
trates me different roles played by states as monopolists, lobbyists, and gap-
bridgers. Finally, the growing international consensus also reveals hitherto 
unknown dynamics in the negotiating process. 
The good offices of the Secretary-General built the first realistic ground-
work for a settlement of me eight-year long war. Whenever the Security Council 
was blocked by one of the permanent members the Secretary-General became 
instrumental in maintaining channels of communication between all parties to 
the conflict. His judgement was viewed by both sides as being neutral and 
helpful. His effectiveness was not affected even when me Security Council took 
on its proactive role as envisioned in the UN Charter. In this situation the 
Secretary-General was formally given the mandate to initiate new approaches 
for mediation. 
For the Secretary-General to have a strong role, it is necessary that the 
five permanent members agree on a certain approach toward an international 
problem. This must not be formalized. Itismuchmoreeffectiveif itis informally 
decided upon as a so-called "gentlemen's agreement" Informal consultations 
have taken place ever since the UN was founded, but they were not used very 
often for joint action. Only with the end of me ideological impasse did the 
Security Council begin to function as it was intended by its founders. After 40 
years of existence the five permanent members became a highly influential 
international lobby group. With Resolution 598 they, the other Council 
members and their advisers in the UN secretariat created a masterpiece of 
diplomacy. The decision-making experience of Resolution 598 was later used 
to deal with other conflicts in Namibia, Central America, Kuwait, Cambodia and 
Yugoslavia. 
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